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SUMMARY
A key feature of cyber attack investigations is to quickly understand the capabilities
and payloads of malware so proper countermeasures can be adopted. Unfortunately, due
to a lack of execution insight, current techniques for exposing these capabilities are pro-
hibitively limited. Enter FORSEE, a tool developed by CyFI Lab researchers that lever-
ages memory image forensics and symbolic analysis to quickly and efficiently discover
capabilities in malware. FORSEE uses the concrete execution state extracted from a mal-
ware’s memory to explore potential execution paths starting from the point of capture. By
coordinating their analysis with FORSEE, malware analysts can simplify and accelerate
their reverse engineering efforts. Similar to this use case, the work presented in this the-
sis coordinates the symbolic analysis from FORSEE with reverse engineering to assess




Currently, cyberattack investigations primarily rely on investigating actions already taken
by a malware. After detecting a malware, investigators often rely on log analysis to deter-
mine the source and extent of the damage from an attack [1, 2, 3, 4]. However, malware
have often not yet executed all their payloads at the time of detection, particularly during
multi-staged attacks, and especially in advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks. It is then
critical to quickly reveal and understand these future capabilities, as failure to do so could
hinder the deployment of mitigations and lead to additional compromises.
Unfortunately, investigating future malware behaviors remains a laborious and largely
manual effort due to inherent difficulties in binary analysis. Static analysis [5, 6, 7] gives a
global perspective of a malware’s capabilities, but it lacks the execution context provided
by dynamic analysis. Symbolic execution is promising for capability exploration, but it
suffers from the path explosion problem, which often makes it impractical [8, 9, 10, 11,
12]. Environment-specific conditions, like a received command or a characteristic of a
system that identifies it as a desired infection target, prevent dynamic analysis techniques,
like [13, 11, 14], from discovering inaccessible payloads. Concolic analysis [15, 16, 17]
allows for a trade-off between path explosion and code coverage, but it requires access
to the malware’s input and environment ahead of time, thus limiting the discovery of a
malware’s payloads and capabilities.
Meanwhile, recent developments in memory image forensics have allowed for evidence
collection and crime investigation capabilities that are currently unrivaled by any tech-
niques in malware analysis. A process’s memory image provides a wealth of data about
the current execution state, which can be extracted to inform analysis. Specifically, the
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Figure 1.1: FORSEE workflow. The input memory image is passed through the memory
image forensics module to reconstruct the process’s execution state. Symbolic exploration
and static analysis are then used in tandem to explore the memory image code. The output
is a set of discovered paths with API annotations for each path.
and environment-specific state, at a single point in time. Moreover, if symbolic analysis is
started from the execution state at the memory image’s capture point, we can dynamically
concretize symbolic constraints using concrete data in the memory image to mitigate the
path explosion problem. FORSEE, a tool developed by CyFI Lab researchers, builds upon
the above ideas to enable the quick and efficient discovery of malware behaviors. FORSEE
takes in a forensic memory image and utilizes symbolic execution to explore the malware
starting from the last instruction pointer of the captured process, while incorporating con-
crete data present in the memory image to concretize path constrains and alleviate path
explosion. The overall workflow of FORSEE is shown in Figure 1.1. An example output
for an exploration of a malware memory image is shown in Figure 1.2.
The main effort behind FORSEE has been carried out by Moses Ike, a PhD student
that has been working with me. The work presented in this thesis coordinates the sym-
bolic analysis from FORSEE with manual reverse engineering to aid in the assessment of
FORSEE’s effectiveness and assist in future development. The remainder of the thesis is
organized as follows:
In Chapter 2, I review previous research that is relevant to FORSEE, particularly sym-
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Figure 1.2: FORSEE output for symbolic path exploration of the xTBot malware.
bolic and concolic analysis (both applied to malware and not), memory forensics as applied
to malware analysis, and the recovery of the semantic structure from a memory image.
Chapter 3 explores two anti-virtual machine, or anti-VM, malware samples. First, the
tasks required to analyze the samples, particularly unpacking and disassembly, are exam-
ined, and the tools the tools required to analyze the samples are also discussed. Then, I
discuss the functionality discovered in the malware samples and how they were analyzed
by FORSEE, and then I present the results of FORSEE’s analysis for one of the samples.
Chapter 4 examines five programs, two malicious and three nonmalicious, for which
source code was available. The advantages of analysis using source code as opposed to
binary analysis are discussed briefly, followed by the steps required to analyze each sample.
Paths for each sample were determined for a variety of different inputs, then they were
given to FORSEE to see if the same paths could be discovered. The results given by
FORSEE compared to the manually obtained paths are provided, along with an in-depth
example of one of the manually obtained paths.
Chapter 5 looks at an Android malware sample that will be useful to have as a source of
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ground truth for future FORSEE development for Android. Certain aspects of the Android
system that pertain to the malware are discussed, along with the tools used to analyze
the sample. Then, I go through the steps taken to analyze the sample, followed by the
discovered functionality. Finally, I discuss the particular aspects of the analysis that will be
useful to FORSEE.
Chapter 6 briefly examines binary exploits and their relevance to a future version of
FORSEE that will work with multiple memory images in the form of crash dumps. An
example of a vulnerability, along with a working exploit, are then presented. Finally, I




Symbolic execution was introduced for software testing and debugging [18, 19, 20]. In the
past, symbolic analysis has largely focused on bug, vulnerability, and crash detection [16,
21, 22], software test case generation [23, 16, 12, 17, 15], and informing and enhancing
dynamic analysis [13, 24, 14]. However, symbolic execution is often difficult to use be-
cause of the path explosion problem. Many researchers have attempted to address the path
explosion problem, including through state merging [10], path partitioning [25], redundant
path elimination [26, 27], subsumption checking [28], and concolic analysis [15, 16, 17].
More examples of concolic analysis include FuzzBall [29], which concretizes symbolic
constraints with initialized program states, and MAYHEM [12], which tries to manage path
explosion by utilizing a combination of offline and online concolic execution. FORSEE
mitigates the path explosion problem by utilizing concrete data present in memory images,
reducing the size of the symbolic state space. Unlike other techniques, FORSEE does
not require access to a program’s input or execution environment, which is necessary for
concolic analysis.
There has been a substantial amount of research into using symbolic and concolic anal-
ysis to study malware. BitScope [11] employs whole system emulation to symbolically
analyze a target program to detect malware behaviors by comparing synthesized input and
generated output. Moser et al. [14] run a program multiple times and track branch con-
ditions to explore execution paths in malware. X-Force [30] exposes hidden behaviors in
malware by running binaries multiple times while forcing through execution paths where
it lacks the required input. Baldoni et al. [31] study the payloads of a malware via a static
analysis approach that limits the size of symbolic variables, while also simulating Win32
APIs. Yadegari et al. [32] demonstrate the shortcomings of symbolic and concolic anal-
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ysis by showing how they are affected by obfuscation techniques. FORSEE, unlike the
previous work, starts exploration from a memory image that allows it to inform symbolic
analysis and concretize path constraints.
There has also been research into applying memory image forensics to malware analy-
sis. Carbone et al. [33] check kernel integrity and detect kernel-mode malware by mapping
dynamic kernel data in the memory layout. Cui et al. [34] present a technique that can
detect kernel rootkits by identifying and traversing through static kernel objects in mem-
ory. Rhee et al. [35] track memory access patterns on kernel data objects, allowing them to
create malware signatures and detect rootkits. Jackdaw [36] is a system that creates a list of
dynamic traces and ranks them to unveil potentially malicious behaviors. AUTOVAC [37]
generates vaccines to neutralize malware based on system-resource-sensitive conditions
that are extracted by monitoring data propagation from system calls. FORSEE is different
from the previous work because it only requires a single memory image and does not need
the original binary, a sandbox environment, or signatures. Using only the memory image,
FORSEE can reconstruct the process’s execution state and explore its functionality.
Research into recovering the semantic structure of a program from a memory image
is another area of research related to FORSEE. Dolan et al. [38] use program emula-
tion to mine memory accesses and locate useful program locations to actively monitor for
memory reads and writes. MACE [39] is a memory analysis system that leverages pointer
constraints to find kernel objects. Lin et al. [40] develop a technique called REWARDS
which tags memory accesses with timestamped type attributes to reconstruct in-memory
data structures. Howard [41] performs dynamic analysis to track how a program uses
memory so that it can detect data structures for stripped C binaries. Techniques involv-
ing data structure recovery have also been studied in the Android operating system. Bhatia
et al. [42] recover data structures from Android’s ActivityManagerService, which are cre-
ated by launched activities in Android and remain in memory for an extended time period.
RetroScope [43] uses a phone’s memory image to recover previous screens of an Android
6
application. On the other hand, FORSEE differs because it uses process semantic infor-
mation retrieved from memory images to rebuild an acquired program’s memory layout.
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CHAPTER 3
REVERSE ENGINEERING X86 ANTI-VM WINDOWS MALWARE
An anti-virtual machine (or anti-VM) malware is a malware that has an anti-dynamic anal-
ysis functionality which causes it to behave differently inside VMs when executed. This is
useful to malware because analysis is usually done inside a virtual machine, primarily to
prevent damage being done to a real system but also because virtual machines can easily
be restored to a clean state. The technique is often considered obsolete for use in modern
malware since virtualization has become so common that anti-VM techniques will prevent
the malware from running on a large number of desirable targets [44, pp. 369-370]. Re-
gardless, it is still a well-known technique that is common in older malware and is still
sometimes seen in current malware.
Two anti-VM samples were chosen for analysis, Trojan-Downloader.Win32.IstBar1 and
Trojan.Agent.CVYB2, according to the most common name given by VirusTotal [45]. Each
malware sample was statically analyzed, and the anti-VM check was located within the
disassembled code along with the code path needed to reach that point. Additionally, a
memory dump was taken for each sample using the debugger WinDbg for FORSEE to
explore. The steps required to analyze the malware are outlined below.
3.1 Disassembly
Since malware almost never comes with source code, it is often necessary to perform anal-
ysis on a binary that has been disassembled from binary into assembly instructions. There
are many different disassemblers, but the one used to analyze these samples was IDA Pro,




ware analysis. However, while IDA is a very good disassembler, it is not infallible. Due to a
number of reasons, notably because there is no real way to reliably differentiate between in-
structions and data within a binary and the lengths of instructions in x86 can vary, there are
many so-called anti-disassembly techniques that can make disassembly extremely difficult.
Fortunately, anti-disassembly behavior was not observed in either of these two malware
samples.
3.2 Packing
Packing programs or packers use compression to shrink the size of an executable file, while
including an unpacking routine (often called an unpacking stub) inside the newly packed
executable to extract the packed code and data. When a packed program is executed, the
program runs the unpacking stub and then executes the original code. Packers may also
utilize encryption algorithms instead of or in combination with compression. Packers are
sometimes used in benign programs to reduce the size of a program, but are often used
in malware because they can be used to complicate analysis and thwart detection by anti-
virus software. Disassembling a packed executable is useless because the only thing an
analyst will see is the unpacking routine. Additionally, since a packer will also pack import
information stored in an executable, the information about which external functions the
malware is using is also lost. So, in order to perform useful static analysis, the work done
by the packer must first be undone. Depending on the sophistication of the packer used by
the program in question, the complexity of this task can vary greatly [44, Chapter 18].
In general, the vast majority of malware are packed. According to a Black Hat presen-
tation [46], packed binaries made up over 92% of malware taken from a sample size of 739
in March 2006. Unsurprisingly, both the anti-VM samples being analyzed were discovered
to be packed binaries. The way this is determined can vary, but there are a number of dif-
ferent methods, including using packer detectors like PEiD, checking to see if the program
has few (if any) imports, and looking at how much of the binary is recognized as code in a
9
Figure 3.1: PEiD Window for Trojan-Downloader.Win32.IstBar.
Figure 3.2: How much code is recognized in a packed executable, shown by IDA for
Trojan-Downloader.Win32.IstBar.
disassembler (because only the packing routine, which should be relatively small, will be
used as code) [44, pp. 387-388]. PEiD is shown correctly identifying the packer for the
first sample (Trojan-Downloader.Win32.IstBar) as UPX in Figure 3.1, although it was un-
successful for the second sample (Trojan.Agent.CVYB). The difference in how much code
is recognized in IDA in the packed and unpacked binaries for the first sample are shown in
Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 respectively (the same behavior was also observed for the second
sample). Finally, Figure 3.4 shows the message IDA will show when you open a packed
executable with a destroyed imports segment (once again, this was seen in both samples).
Figure 3.3: How much code is recognized in an unpacked executable, shown by IDA for
Trojan-Downloader.Win32.IstBar after being unpacked.
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Figure 3.4: IDA message when opening a packed executable.
Fortunately, in the case of the first sample, the unpacking steps were simple. As men-
tioned above, PEiD was able to identify the packer as UPX [47], a very commonly used
free and open-source packer. UPX can simply unpack an executable to its original form by
running it on the packed executable with the -d flag. The output is the original executable
with all code and imports intact.
In the case of the second sample (Trojan.Agent.CVYB), things were more complicated.
In this case, PEiD was unable to identify the packer. Another tool identified the packer as
UPX v1.95, but this turned out to be incorrect. In cases where more sophisticated packing
methods are used and there is no automated solution, the malware must be unpacked manu-
ally. The way this is usually done is by running the program through its unpacker routine in
a debugger, then extracting the unpacked contents from memory to create a new unpacked
executable. Unfortunately, when using this method, the headers for the executable (in par-
ticular imports and the program entry point before being packed, often called the OEP or
original entry point) are not valid and so must be fixed manually.
The tools used to perform the unpacking were a debugger called OllyDbg with a plug-
in called OllyDump. OllyDbg is shown unpacking the malware in Figure 3.5. Another
tool called ImpRec or Import Reconstructor can then be used to reconstruct the import
table. After stepping through the packing routine in the debugger, extracting the incomplete
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executable, then reconstructing the import table, the malware was able to be analyzed in a
disassembler.
3.3 Discovered Functionality
After retrieving the unpacked executables, the anti-VM checks could be located in the static
code. Fortunately, common anti-VM techniques tend to use x86 instructions that are very
rare in user-mode code. The most common of these instructions are: sidt, sgdt, sldt, smsw,
str, in, and cpuid [44, p. 377]. In both malware samples, locating the anti-VM check was a
matter of searching through the disassembly for these instructions. The anti-VM check is
shown in IDA for the first sample in Figure 3.6 and for the second sample in Figure 3.7.
After the anti-VM checks were located statically, each of the malware needed to have
memory images captured and explored using FORSEE. We decided it was only necessary
to examine one of the two malware, so the first sample, Trojan-Downloader.Win32.IstBar
was selected. For this sample, we took a memory image after a predefined amount of time
and passed it to FORSEE. We observed that the code section was unpacked in memory.
Using the memory image, FORSEE found the anti-VM check used by the malware as
shown in Figure 3.6. Overall, exploring the sample’s memory image yielded a total of
89 program paths in 106 seconds, 3 of which revealed the anti-VM capability along their
paths.
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Figure 3.5: Unpacking Trojan.Agent.CVYB in OllyDbg. A part of the malware’s disas-
sembled unpacking routine is shown in the top pane, and the unpacked executable is shown
in memory in the bottom pane.
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Figure 3.6: Anti-VM check in sample 1, Trojan-Downloader.Win32.IstBar.
Figure 3.7: Anti-VM check in sample 2, Trojan.Agent.CVYB.
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CHAPTER 4
ANALYZING CODE PATHS FOR PROGRAMS WITH SOURCE CODE
As mentioned in Section 3.1, in the domain of malware analysis, working with source code
is a rarity. However, in cases where source code is available, analysis becomes significantly
easier. High-level programming languages are inherently more readable than assembly
languages, and you don’t need to deal with the inaccuracies that are often present in disas-
sembled code. Due to the fact that accurate analysis with source code is much easier, five
programs where source code was available, two malicious and three nonmalicious, were
analyzed.
The two malicious programs chosen were xTBot, a malware written in C, and LokiRat,
a malware written in C#. XTBot is an IRC bot malware based off of another malware called
rBot. Infected hosts can be directed via an IRC channel to perform tasks like: steal CD keys
for a number of popular video games, download files, execute arbitrary commands, and
perform DDOS attacks. LokiRAT is a RAT (remote access trojan) that can control infected
hosts through a central server, in this case a PHP-based web server. The attacker can do
things like: take pictures from a user’s webcam, kill arbitrary processes, display messages,
execute arbitrary commands, and download files. A portion of the source code showing
some of the commands being parsed for xTBot and LokiRat are shown in in Figure 4.1 and
Figure 4.2 respectively. The three benign programs, netstat, ipconfig, and arp, are three
command-line tools that are built into windows. While source code is not available for the
Microsoft-developed versions of these programs, open-source versions of these tools were
obtained from ReactOS [48], a project that aims to create a free and open-source alternative
to Windows.
Once the source code for all the programs was obtained and the programs were com-
piled, starting points were selected for each of the programs, and paths were traced manu-
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Figure 4.1: A sample of xTBot’s C source code which shows the code responsible for
parsing and executing some of its commands. In particular, the syn command which is
shown here initiates a SYN flood of a target, demonstrating the bot’s DDOS capability.
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Figure 4.2: A sample of LokiRat’s C# source code which shows the code responsible for
parsing and executing some of its commands. This code segment is from a code stub which
is used by the client to build the malicious program that is distributed to infection targets.
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ally from those starting points to a predefined end point. Paths to explore were selected so
that a given path would be distinct for a particular input to the program. For the nonmali-
cious programs, the inputs were command line arguments, while the inputs to the malicious
programs were received commands. Since the purpose of analyzing these programs was
to correlate the manually obtained paths with the path exploration capability of FORSEE,
these paths had to be explored within the binaries to match it to what FORSEE would see.
However, by using source code, the binary analysis was simplified because the programs
could be compiled with debug symbols, and the source code could be used as a reference
when the binary was explored. After the paths were obtained, the programs needed to be
executed with the appropriate inputs so that a memory image could be captured at the start
of the path and passed to FORSEE for exploration. The tool used to find the paths within
the binaries was IDA, where its graph view (shown in Figure 4.3) was especially useful,
and the tool used to collect the memory images was WinDbg.
A unique challenge was posed in completing this task for the LokiRat sample. The first
problem was that this program was written in C#, which, despite the fact that it stores its
code in an .exe file, is a language that compiles to an intermediate language called CIL and
executes in a virtual machine, similar to how Java works. Fortunately, IDA recognizes CIL
correctly as shown in Figure 4.4. The paths were then able to be determined from this IDA
output. The second problem was that the server that sends commands to the client could
not be set up. To get past this, the source code was modified to force execution through the
path we were interested in by hard coding the command string.
An example of the manually determined paths for arp is shown in Table 4.1. The final
results of FORSEE’s path exploration against the manually determined ground truth is
shown in Table 4.2.
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Figure 4.3: IDA’s graph view for a section of the code in the arp binary. This view is useful
for tracing the execution paths in a program.
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Figure 4.4: IDA loading a compiled C# Program. It correctly recognizes it as .Net assembly
and is able to decompile it to CIL successfully.
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Table 4.1: Paths for ARP with the -a flag.
Basic Block # Address First Instruction
1 0x140002015 xor edx, edx
2 0x1400015D0 mov [rsp + 0x16], rdx
3 0x14000189E cmp [rsp + 0x28], 0
4 0x140001653 mov r8d, 0x1C
5 0x140001694 mov rax, [rsp + 0x28]
6 0x14000169E lea rcx, ...
7 0x1400016AF mov [rsp + 0x20], 0
8 0x1400016FD mov r8d, 0x1C
9 0x140001749 mov [rsp + 0x34], 0
10 0x14000175D mov rax, [rsp + 0x38]
11 0x1400017C5 mov eax, 0x18
12 0x140001809 mov rax, [rsp + 0x28]
13 0x14000189A xor eax, eax
14 0x1400018DF mov rcx, [rsp + 0x80]
15 0x1400018A6 call __imp_GetProcessHeap
16 0x1400018BC cmp [rsp + 0x38], 0
17 0x1400018C4 call __imp_GetProcessHeap
18 0x1400018DA mov eax, 1
19 0x14000167E lea rcx, ...
20 0x14000172F mov edx, [rsp + 0x40]
Path Name Path by Basic Block Numbers
A 1, 2, 3, 16, 18, 14
B 1, 2, 4, 19, 3, 15, 16, 18, 14
C 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 3, 15, 16, 18, 14
D 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 3, 15, 16, 18, 14
E 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 20, 3, 15, 16, 17, 18, 14
F 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14
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Table 4.2: Measuring the impact of concrete data on FORSEE’s post-detection forward
exploration.
Malware
Ground Truth FORSEE Results
Concretized
C&C Commands Paths Paths TP FP TN FN Accuracy (%)
LokiRAT
regnewkey 4 5 4 1 n/a 0 80
message 4 4 4 0 n/a 0 100
rename 2 2 2 0 n/a 0 100
xTBot
.ntstats 1 1 1 0 n/a 0 100
.netinfo 2 2 2 0 n/a 0 100
.sysinfo 28 30 27 2 n/a 1 90.0
Benign Apps.
Concretized
Command Switches Paths Paths TP FP TN FN Accuracy (%)
Netstat
-a 3 3 3 0 n/a 0 100
-e 3 3 3 0 n/a 0 100
-r 2 2 2 0 n/a 0 100
Ipconfig
-release 4 4 4 0 n/a 0 100
-renew 6 5 5 0 n/a 1 83.3
-no-flag 19 18 16 2 n/a 1 84.2
Arp
-a 6 6 6 0 n/a 0 100
-d 192.168.56.11 8 7 7 0 n/a 1 87.5
-s 08:00:27:cf:b8:20 11 12 10 1 n/a 1 83.3
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CHAPTER 5
REVERSE ENGINEERING ANDROID MALWARE
We decided that a concrete source of ground truth would be useful for future development
of FORSEE on Android and ARM. For this purpose, I chose to reverse engineer a sample1
from the Android malware family Ewind. Ewind masquerades as a legitimate Android app
to the user, but in the background it communicates with a command and control (C2) server
that allows an attacker to execute commands on a victim’s device. The attacker can display
advertisements, steal the user’s SMS messages, collect other device data, and perform a
few other actions.
5.1 Android System
While it is possible to write Android apps entirely or partially in languages that compile
to native code like C or C++ [49], the vast majority of Android code is written in either
Java or the new Kotlin programming language, introduced in Android Studio 3.0.0 in Oc-
tober 2007 [50]. Outside of Android, both of these languages normally compile to Java
bytecode and run within a virtual machine called the Java virtual machine (JVM). In An-
droid, they instead compile into a custom bytecode format called Dalvik bytecode [51],
stored within a Dalvik executable (.dex) file. Prior to Android 5.0, these files would be
run in the Dalvik virtual machine, but starting with Android version 5.0, the Android Run-
time (ART) was introduced as the default runtime [52]. With ART, Android began using
ahead-of-time (AOT) compilation instead of the previously used just-in-time (JIT) compi-
lation [53]. The way this works is that whenever an app is installed, the .dex file is run
through an on-device tool called dex2oat, which compiles the native code into a .oat file
for the targeted device [54]. This performs better, since the virtual machine doesn’t have to
1SHA-256 Hash: 9c61616a66918820c936297d930f22df5832063d6e5fc2bea7576f873e7a5cf3
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Figure 5.1: An example of an APK file’s contents after being extracted.
perform compilation at runtime. This is also useful for FORSEE, because we can use the
Android Open Source Project (AOSP) [55] to build dex2oat and cross-compile an Android
program into an .oat file on any machine. Then, we can use a separate tool in the AOSP
called oatdump to parse the contents of the .oat file and identify functions present in the
.dex file. This means that when FORSEE is exploring binary code in an Android memory
image, we have a way to match it to code in the .dex file or source code.
When an Android program is compiled, it is packaged into an Android Package (APK)
file. An APK file is just a standard ZIP archive given a different file extension but with
specific contents, with an example shown in Figure 5.1. The contents of this ZIP archive
include the .dex file, which contains the code for the application (however, if any native
code is contained, these files are present in architecture-specific folders within a folder
named lib), any resources (like images), and the AndroidManifest.xml file (also referred
to as the manifest) [56], which is a binary XML that contains some additional information
about the app. The main useful pieces of information in the manifest are permissions
required by the app and any declared components (components are discussed below). An
example of a manifest file is shown in Figure 5.2.
Unlike programs on most other systems, Android applications do not have a "main"
method that marks a single entry point into the program. Instead, entry points into an app
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Figure 5.2: A sample of Ewind’s manifest file after being converted to plaintext, showing
declared app permissions and the targeted Android version.
are found within four different types of components [57]:
1. Activities - components which represent a screen with a user interface
2. Services - components for code that should run in the background but may also dis-
play a notification
3. Broadcast receivers - components that send and respond to certain events, which may
originate from the Android system itself
4. Content providers - components that manage a shared set of app data that can be
modified or queried and are stored in some form of app-accessible permanent storage,
like a database
Each of these components must be declared in the manifest file, although broadcast re-
ceivers may be registered at runtime with the registerReceiver function. For all but content
providers, components are activated with asynchronous messages called intents, which can
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be thought of as messages that request an action from another component. On the other
hand, content providers are activated with a request from a ContentResolver object.
A common way to run code in the background is by responding to something like a
boot event with a broadcast receiver, which can respond to events independent of the main
application being launched if they are registered in the manifest, then starting a background
service. This is used in both malicious and benign applications that need to do work in the
background. Starting in Android 3.1, however, a security feature was introduced that made
it so that broadcast receivers will not receive any events from the Android system until the
app is launched at least once [58]. This is because all apps are initially in a "stopped" state
when they are installed and exit that state when they are launched. Apps can also return to
a stopped state if an app is force stopped.
5.2 Reverse Engineering
5.2.1 Decompiling
When lacking source code, decompilation can be used to turn a compiled binary into a high-
level language (as opposed to disassembly, which instead turns a binary into an assembly
language). However, decompilation is extremely difficult and often unreliable. Fortunately,
bytecode like Dalvik is much easier to decompile than machine code. Thus, it is possible
to take an APK and extract its Dalvik executable (classes.dex) and decompile it to usable
Java code. The Dalvik bytecode can also be disassembled into a format known as smali,
however, Java source is significantly easier to read.
Unfortunately, decompilation is still not perfect. Some methods cannot always be de-
compiled, so these methods must either be disassembled or decompiled by hand. Further-
more, the names of functions, classes, and variables are obfuscated and thus give no indica-
tion to their function, and sometimes, multiple variables or functions can even have name
collisions (the same names within a given namespace), demonstrated in Figure 5.3. Finally,
named constants in the original code are simply represented directly with their values in
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Figure 5.3: An example of the obfuscated code output by jadx for Ewind, with class names
on the left and decompiled Java code on the right.
the decompiled version, including all references to the app’s non-code assets (resources),
which are normally referenced by variable names which map to integer IDs.
There are many tools that can be used to decompile an Android app to Java code. You
can use a tool called dex2jar [59] to convert a .dex file to a normal Java JAR file, which
can then be decompiled by Java decompilers like CFR [60], JD-GUI [61], Procyon [62],
and Fernflower [63]. Another decompiler called jadx [64] operates directly on an APK or
.dex file. In the end, jadx was selected to decompile this malware sample, primarily for two
reasons: (1) it has a --deobf flag which adds extra characters to names to prevent variable
and function name collisions and (2) for functions that cannot be decompiled, it outputs a
smali-like format rather than just having a comment indicating an error message.
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5.2.2 Static and Dynamic Analysis
With decompiled code acquired, static analysis becomes a task of reading the decompiled
source code to understand the inner workings of the malware. However, largely due to the
issues outlined in Subsection 5.2.1, while easier than reading assembly code, static analysis
in Android with decompiled code is still a non-trivial task.
For trojans like this malware sample, separating the code that corresponds to the
legitimate application from the malware components can often be difficult. Fortu-
nately, in Ewind, all the malicious code is contained within classes that have the prefix
b93478b8cdba429894e2a63b70766f91, so, in this case, identifying the parts that corre-
spond to the malicious code is not difficult. However, there were some other challenges
that arose while reverse engineering this malware sample. For instance, many strings in the
decompiled code are obfuscated by being stored as a large byte array that is (cyclically)
xored with the string “a5ca9525-c9ff-4a1d-bb42-87fed1ea0117” at runtime. The proper
values of the strings were determined by running that portion of the Java code in a normal
Java environment and outputting the deobfuscated array of strings. Another problem is that
a method that turned out to be an important part of the malware was non-decompilable, so
the smali-like code output by jadx, mentioned in Subsection 5.2.1, had to be hand decom-
piled to Java source. This is shown in Figure 5.4.
In order to run the malware and observe its malicious functionality, the malware needs
to communicate with the C2 server so that it can receive commands. In this case, the
original C2 server was no longer running, so a version of the server had to be created
that emulated the original’s functionality. This was done in Python with Python’s built-in
HttpServer module using the above static analysis steps to determine what the malware sent
and expected from the server in response. The connection to the C2 server also had to be
redirected to the emulated server, which was achieved by modifying the Android system’s
host file.
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Figure 5.4: A sample of smali-like code output by jadx for Ewind when it can’t decompile
a method, shown in the commented text at the top, followed by the hand-decompiled Java
code at the bottom.
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Figure 5.5: A portion of the onReceive entry point within Ewind’s broadcast receiver com-
ponent named Receiver. The method parses the intent and performs the appropriate action
based on its contents.
5.3 Discovered Functionality
The main entry point in the malware can be located in an Android broadcast re-
ceiver component simply called Receiver, which is launched through its onReceive
method, shown in Figure 5.5. It responds to events in the background regardless of
whether the main app is running or not, assuming the app is not in a stopped state
due to the security feature mentioned in Section 5.1. The system events that it can re-
ceive are: SMS_RECEIVED, BOOT_COMPLETED, USER_PRESENT, CONNECTIV-
ITY_CHANGE, PACKAGE_ADDED, and PACKAGE_REMOVED. It is also responsible
for handling other initialization for the malware.
One other major component is SystemService, which is launched whenever commu-
nication is required with the C2 server. SystemService responds to the following actions
contained in the intent it is launched with: "queue", "delay.fullscreen", and "timer." The
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"queue" action means that SystemService will step through and send all queued messages
to the C2 server, the "delay.fullscreen" means that a showFullScreen action was previously
requested on a delay and is now being executed, and the "timer" action means that a timed
request to the C2 server has been initiated (these happen at regular intervals). Whenever
the C2 server is contacted, it responds with an "ok" message to acknowledge the message,
and the response may also contain one or more additional commands, which the malware
then parses and executes. The messages sent to and from the C2 server are contained within
JSON objects encoded as strings and stored within a POST message body. Additionally,
the messages are sent through plaintext over HTTP and are unencrypted. An example of a
communication between the C2 server and the malware is shown in Figure 5.6.
The malware contacts the C2 server in four situations: 1) when a timer goes off that
fires every 10 minutes by default (can be adjusted by a command), 2) whenever an event
on the device occurs, where an event signifies something that the C2 server is interested
in, like the screen turning off or the app’s admin privileges being activated or deactivated,
3) when acknowledging a command sent by the C2 server, or 4) when sending the initial
message to set up communication with the C2 server; this happens at first whenever a
USER_PRESENT event occurs (meanings the device has been unlocked) or when the boot
completed event occurs. The initial message also contains information about the user’s
device like their installed Android version, the device’s MAC address, and the device’s
phone number. The code that constructs this initial message is shown in Figure 5.7.
There are a total of sixteen commands that can be received from the C2 server for the
malware to execute, along with an additional "ok" command that doesn’t represent some-
thing to execute but is used to acknowledge receipt of a message. Each of the commands
can be seen listed in plaintext in the function that creates each command class, shown in
Figure 5.8. The sixteen commands, along with a brief description of what they do are listed
below:
1. showFullscreen - Display an ad and send an event to the C2 server if the ad is closed
31
Figure 5.6: A flowchart showing how the malware initializes communication to the C2
server and executes commands.
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Figure 5.7: The code responsible for constructing the initial message that contains device
information to the C2 server.
or clicked, this command is shown being run in Figure 5.9.
2. showDialog - Display a dialog that can uninstall a package or load a URL when it is
clicked, while also informing the C2 server when it is clicked.
3. showNotification - Display a status bar notification that informs the C2 server when
it is clicked.
4. createShortcut - Download an APK and create a shortcut to it.
5. openUrl - Display a URL using an ACTION_VIEW.
6. changeTimerInterval - Change the timer interval, in minutes, that the C2 server is
contacted with.
7. sleep - Sleep for some amount of time, in minutes, during which malicious activity
is suspended.
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8. getInstalledApps - Enumerate a list of all installed applications and send it to the C2
server.
9. changeMonitoringApps - Change the list of monitored apps, informing the C2 server
when one of them is in the foreground.
10. wifiToMobile - Disable Wi-Fi and force the device to switch to mobile data, although
this doesn’t work and actually does nothing.
11. openUrlInBackground - Load a URL in the background in a WebView and optionally
run some JavaScript code in it.
12. webClick - Load a URL in a WebView that executes JavaScript code when certain
URLs are loaded, simulates hyperlink clicks, and reports messages to the C2 server
with event "js.data."
13. receiveSms - Enable or disable SMS monitoring and, if it is enabled, notify the C2
server with event "receive.sms" if any SMS message is received.
14. smsFilters - Filter by a list of message and phone number regular expressions. When
an SMS message is received, if both the number and message match any in the list,
notify the C2 server with event "sms.filter."
15. adminActivate - Request the user for admin access for the app (mainly because apps
with admin can’t be uninstalled), this command is shown being run in Figure 5.10.
16. adminDeactivate - Deactivate admin access for the app.
Sometimes, there are issues with apps written for older versions of Android when they
run on newer versions of Android. This is especially noticeable with malware, which
often use vulnerabilities that are later patched. In this case, the Android version that the
malware was initially run on was Android 7.0, where it was discovered that some parts
of the malware no longer worked correctly. In particular, the functionality that reports
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Figure 5.8: The code in Ewind responsible for constructing a command class object. This
shows all the command names it expects from the C2 server in plaintext.
the current foreground application to the C2 server does not work on Android versions
past 4.4. However, some of the commands, along with the main part of the malware that
communicates with the C2 server, still work on Android versions at least as late as Android
7.0.
In the end, finding callbacks that act as entry points into malicious routines and the
events that trigger those callbacks (for instance, the USER_PRESENT event that triggers
the Receiver.onReceive function) was especially important when analyzing this sample.
This is because the idea with the Android version of FORSEE is that it will, by taking
advantage of the mechanisms that Android uses internally to handle events and callbacks,
use concrete data present in a memory image to determine which callbacks a malware is
likely to execute in the near future. By understanding how the callbacks within this sample
work and how they are triggered, along with providing the mechanisms to trigger these
events (i.e., through the reconstructed C2 server), we can correlate the manually obtained
callbacks with the event exploration capability of the Android version of FORSEE.
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Figure 5.9: The result of a successful command from the C2 server to display an ad. Any
web page can be displayed, but the image shown comes from a page that was actually
displayed when the real C2 server was still running.
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Figure 5.10: The result of a successful command from the C2 server to request admin




A BRIEF FORAY INTO BINARY EXPLOITATION
Binary exploitation refers to the process of exploiting some kind of vulnerability in an
application to cause unintended behavior, usually in some way that is advantageous to an
attacker. A common end goal is to, for example, initiate a root command-line shell on a
system. Often, when someone is trying to exploit a program, an attack is crafted, and if
it doesn’t work (which will usually cause the program to crash), it is attempted repeatedly
until it is successful. Because of this characteristic of binary exploits, we had the idea of
extending FORSEE into exploring a program via multiple memory images instead of just
a single one. The primary use case would be to take a series of images taken from crash
dumps and determine if the crashes are benign or part of an ongoing attack.
Similar to Chapter 5, we wanted to have a baseline to be able to test this extension of
FORSEE as it was developed, ideally a real-word example instead of some contrived ex-
ample. To this end, I explored a series of exploits discovered by Google security researchers
[65] in a piece of software called dnsmasq [66]. The two vulnerabilities that were looked
into specifically were: CVE-2017-14493 [67], a stack-based buffer overflow, and CVE-
2017-14494 [68], an information leak. Both exploits involve bugs in the implementation of
DHCPv6 in dnsmasq.
A buffer overflow refers to a bug that allows a user to write past the end of a buffer
in memory (usually because the size of the input is not properly checked), allowing an
attacker to overwrite memory that they shouldn’t be able to write to. A common example is
a stack buffer overflow which overwrites past the end of a buffer on the stack, overwriting
the return address for the code that called the current executing function, which lets an
attacker redirect code execution to a location of their choice. An information leak refers to
a vulnerability that allows an attacker to retrieve some information that they shouldn’t have
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access to from a running application, usually the contents of some memory location, that is
often useful to them in constructing an exploit.
Common protections against stack overflows include stack canaries, ASLR, and
executable-space protection. Stack canaries are values inserted into the stack before the
memory location containing the return address in a function’s stack frame. Before a func-
tion returns, the canary is checked to make sure the return address has not been overwritten.
ASLR puts shared libraries, the stack and heap regions, and sometimes even the code in
the binary itself, in randomized locations in the process’ virtual address space, making it
so that code that an attacker might want to execute is in unpredictable locations. This is
useful since an attacker will often want to point the return address after a buffer overflow
to a known code location (often to begin what is known as a ROP chain, where ROP stands
for return-oriented programming). Executable-space protection marks certain sections of
memory as not executable, meaning that if the processor attempts to execute code at those
locations, it will cause an exception. This prevents a common exploit where attackers will
insert code into, for instance, the stack and point the return address to the inserted code.
ASLR for shared libraries, the stack, and the heap is set by the operating system, but stack
canaries, executable-space protection, and ASLR for code internal to the binary, requiring
a position-independent executable (PIE), all require settings to be enabled by the compiler
and are not present in all programs.
A working exploit for the buffer overflow portion was crafted using a ROP chain (by-
passing executable-space protection), but both stack canaries and ASLR were disabled.
The info leak from CVE-2017-14494 was attempted and some progress was made, but a
full working exploit was never successfully crafted. After a lot of experimentation, it was
discovered that the memory that is leaked from the exploit mentioned in the CVE comes
from the memory pointed to by dnsmasq_daemon->outpacket.iov_base. Unfortunately, the
leaked memory was located in the heap in an area that made it difficult to locate any useful
information to beat ASLR, and a full exploit beating ASLR was never crafted. Additionally,
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no attempt was made to bypass stack canaries.
As stated earlier, the purpose of investigating binary exploits is to evaluate a version of
FORSEE that takes in multiple memory images. The working exploit described above can
be modified to produce several different versions, each of which fails at a different stage in
the attack. The crash dumps produced during each crash from these non-working exploits
can then be collected and passed to FORSEE. Finally, by exploring these crash dumps in





In this thesis, I have coordinated malware analysis with a tool, FORSEE, that discovers
malware behaviors and capabilities via symbolic analysis on a memory image taken from
a running malware. I show a variety of reverse engineering and analysis techniques that
demonstrate FORSEE’s effectiveness and assist in its future development. By coordinating
these analyses with FORSEE, I have demonstrated FORSEE ’s ability to simplify and
accelerate reverse engineering efforts.
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